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The military ethic is thus pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist, and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession. It is, in brief, realistic and conservative. 1 One of the most widely accepted truisms about the military concerns its supposed preference for a conservative perspective. More specifically, on national security matters the military professional is assumed to espouse a conservative, realist viewpoint. Samuel P. increasingly suggests that this type of mindset is often inappropriate. In the worst case, a conservative realist approach may ultimately endanger rather than protect the security of the state. For example, realism's preoccupation with the state blinds it to the importance of nonstate actors and transnational or asymmetrical threats, which may actually pose the greater danger to national security. At the least, realism may not inculcate the mindset necessary to actively seize opportunities for engagement and cooperation that may enhance the security of the state, in light of its near-exclusive focus on threats. Mounting evidence attesting to the existence of the democratic peace thesis (essentially, the notion that democracies do not go to war with one another) may imply that the U.S. should actively engage other states to promote democracy.
Huntington has provided perhaps the classical exposition of this viewpoint in his work
These limitations of realism are magnified by the conservative bent of realism, which suggests an inability to view trends and events in a novel and positive light. Yet creativity and the flexibility to move beyond the status quo are qualities that are critically necessary to enhance U.S. security in today's complex and fluid international system.
These concerns are particularly germane in the year 2001 as a new American
Administration attempts to fundamentally reassess national security and military strategies, along with accompanying roles, missions, and force structure for the U.S. armed forces. We are still floundering to define ourselves in this nebulous "post-Cold War period." The military's view of the international system with its threats, challenges and opportunities will certainly under gird the estimates made and advice offered about the military's role in national security. Does the professional military possess the most appropriate perspective to provide the best advice possible to the civilian leadership in these circumstances? I am convinced that conservative realism does not provide an adequate guide.
In this paper I will first expand upon the concept of conservative realism as Huntington views it, along with implications for the military and national security. I will also consider both conservatism and realism separately, in order to better draw out certain ideas. The insecurities and fears that this generates are just as evident in our time to Huntington and other realists as they were to Hobbes and Machiavelli. 5 That is because classical realism also assumes that this pattern is unchanging, cyclical, and ultimately does not allow for progress.
It is important to separate out the strands of conservatism and realism in order to
highlight several points which demonstrate weaknesses in Huntington's argument. In fact, just removing the "conservative" adjective from realism might allow for the latter to still serve a useful role in shaping the military perspective. Omitting this label removes the moral, or value-based, aspects of realism-essentially, the idea that man is evil and grasping by nature. Another limitation of the specifically conservative emphasis in Huntington's argument relates to hi analysis of the lack of change in the military ethic. According to Huntington, it is due to the inherent nature of the military function-ensuring security in the face of threats-that no change occurs in the content of the professional ethic. 9 He carries this idea further to argue that the prevailing military outlook on foreign affairs has differed hardly at all in modern times, attributing this to the fact that "the decisive influence shaping the military outlook was not the actual state of world politics, but rather the level of professionalism achieved by the military." Even a cursory review of academic or policy studies related to the current security environment reveals extensive use of adjectives like "uncertain," "dynamic," "fluid,"
"unpredictable," "unknown," "turbulent," "asymmetric" and "complex." While attempts have been made to define and categorize the variety and level of threats to U.S. national security, there is no consensus similar to the one that prevailed about the Soviet threat during the Cold War, even among realists. The U.S. Congress has been so concerned about the implications of this new international system that they chartered the bipartisan United States Commission on National Security/21 st Century (also known as the Hart-Rudman Commission) in 1998 to examine the entire range of U.S. national security policies and processes.
In February 2001 the Hart-Rudman Commission published the third and last of its series of three reports, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change. As the title implies, the commission concluded that the U.S. faces distinctly new dangers, which requires rethinking fundamental assumptions from the Cold War period.
The key to our vision is the need for a culture of coordinated strategic planning to permeate all U.S. national security institutions. Our challenges are no longer defined for us by a single prominent threat. Without creative strategic planning in this new environment, we will default in times of crisis to a reactive posture. Such a posture is inadequate to the challenges and opportunities before us. 13 The criticism here of a reactive posture calls to mind the status quo nature of realism and its limitations in fashioning new policies for the future. Similarly, the Commission stressed that national security could not be narrowly defined any more, but that it had to be broadened and integrated to include economics, technology, and education, among other aspects. 14 However, broadening national security beyond standard military and defense concerns would be an uncomfortable fit for realists. existing studies on the future security environment to identify points of consensus and divergence. 15 Among many other items, the group agreed that there would be more nonstate threats to security and a greater threat of asymmetric attack. Significantly, the group also made a concerted attempt to include dissenting viewpoints because, as Tangredi noted, these viewpoints "lead to plans that can also cope with alternative futures. The dissenting viewpoints are tools against complacency." 16 An example of such an alternative viewpoint was the notion that it might be possible to develop cooperative defenses with potential military rivals. This led to the following interesting conclusion.
Perhaps prudent defense planning requires a blend of the two views in order to deal with a sudden change in circumstance-sort of a cooperation-plus-containment approach that seeks to encourage our fondest hopes at the same time it retains the means of prevailing in our worst nightmares. 17 I cite these points in order to underscore that any security perspective that tends to have a static and narrowly-based approach to the international system is likely to endanger U.S. national security. As the first report of the Hart-Rudman Commission noted, "the very facts of military reality are changing and that bears serious and concentrated reflection. The reflexive habits of mind and action that were the foundation for U.S. Cold War strategy and force structures may not be appropriate for the coming era." 18 Conservative realism and the mindset it perpetuates for the military professional fit this straight jacket and does not provide the flexibility necessary to entertain alternative ideas.
The security perspective employed is significant because it affects not only strategy but also force structure, roles, and missions. All of these issues have achieved prominence under the new Bush Administration and a number of related studies are underway, some official and some
not. Yet even prior to the presidential election, knowledgeable observers and sectors within the defense arena itself were attempting to come to grips with these issues. In "Defending America in the Twenty-first Century" Eliot Cohen pointed to not only failings in U.S. strategy (essentially Cold War derived) but also in military organizational structures, still adapted mainly to a bipolar world. 19 He called for a move from the "two major theater war" (MTW) strategy to one based on American predominance in an international system characterized by "the consequent ambiguity and uncertainty of the circumstances in which the United States will use its military power." 20 In Cohen's view the new strategy should have four components, including defense against weapons of mass destruction, conventional dominance, short term-contingencies, and peace maintenance. Note that the last component of peace maintenance-a concept advocated in numerous studies-would find short shrift from a realist perspective.
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Working Group at the National Defense University found similar concerns, including the need to move away from the two MTW equation. In a report of November 2000, the group identified twelve strategy decisions that it felt the next Administration needed to make, established four broad strategy alternatives based on different world views, described alternative approaches to sizing the U.S. military, provided a methodology for assessing risk, examined strategy-driven integrated paths, and concluded with findings and recommendations. 21 The underlying premise of this analysis is the absolute requirement to question our common assumptions and entertain alternative views and strategies for ensuring national security in this complex environment.
There are any number of additional, wide-ranging reports and studies I could cite here.
What is important for purposes of this analysis is their near-unanimous conclusion that fundamental changes are needed to our current thinking about security and strategy, the use of force, roles and missions; and that we need to consider all alternatives. However, a conservative realist mindset finds it difficult to display the flexibility required for that type of analysis. To continue to urge our military to employ that perspective will handicap, rather than ensure, their ability to maximize the security of the United States.
Finally, another potentially serious problem in promoting conservative realism as the only appropriate mindset for the professional military is apparent when we compare the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war today. Huntington contends, "the ideal military man is thus conservative in strategy, but open-minded and progressive with respect to new weapons and new tactical forms." 22 I believe that there is a fundamental disconnect between expecting the military to adhere to conservative realism at the strategic, or higher levels, and encouraging innovativeness at the lower levels. It is very difficult for the human mind to cope with the dissonance in moving from a conservative strategic approach to an innovative and adaptive operational or tactical approach, and vice versa. In addition, in our current era of nearinstantaneous communication and information, the distinctions between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels become quite fuzzy:
Simultaneous revolutions in military affairs, technology, and information, and a reordering of the international system, have shattered traditional boundaries, merging the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war into a single, integrated universe in which action at the bottom often has instant and dramatic impact at all levels. Never in history have so many strategic burdens confronted the entire chain of command, ranging from the President in the White House all the way down to the individual rifleman at a security checkpoint in Macedonia. 23 Joint Vision 2020, which is meant to guide the continuing transformation of the U.S. armed forces, echoes this conclusion" "individuals will be challenged by significant responsibilities at tactical levels in the organization and must be capable of making decisions with both operational and strategic implications." 24 It only makes sense to conclude that we want our professional military to be innovative and flexible. As Huntington himself says in another context:
Rigid and inflexible obedience may well stifle new ideas and become slave to an unprogressive routine. It is not infrequent that a high command has had its thinking frozen in the past and has utilized its control of the military hierarchy to suppress uncomfortable new developments in tactics and technology. 25 Unfortunately, this is precisely the type of thinking that conservative realism encourages at all levels. It is safe to venture that this status quo attitude would adversely affect the willingness, or ability, of the military to entertain fundamental changes to such things as strategy, roles and The professional military ethic would be best served by the adoption of what I will call a "globalization" perspective here. 26 I employ as non-ideological a term as possible for this perspective, as I do not believe that a political ideology is necessary, or even beneficial, for the military's role of ensuring national security. 27 A globalization ethic implies that a professional military officer would be attuned to both threats and opportunities that arise at all levels of the international system. In other words, both threats and opportunities would be viewed in tandem In addition, the ability to analyze intentions and to understand the perspective of potential enemies is essential to the concept of deterrence. Colin Gray rightfully points out that deterrence is much more problematic for the United States to achieve today than during the Cold War. Not only are we unsure whom we may wish to deter, but it is also much more difficult for the U.S. to understand the variety of motivations of state and nonstate actors that may pose a threat. 28 Yet realism makes no contextual allowance for the different motivations that may impel actors, an understanding of which is crucial to devise effective deterrence strategies. Nor does realism give much credence to the increasingly asymmetric threat arising from nonstate actors, all of whom are obviously much more difficult to deter. Again, a globalization perspective which places emphasis on an understanding of the variety of actors in the international system, regardless of their category, seems much more likely to provide us with the possibility to either preempt or coopt potential adversaries.
Both joint doctrine and writings from U.S. military leaders increasingly demonstrate awareness of the necessity-indeed, responsibility--for a changing military viewpoint on security matters. The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) provides specifically for a formal method for the U.S. military leadership to engage in "continuous study of the strategic environment to identify conditions or trends that may warrant a change in the strategic direction of the Armed
Forces." 29 Concepts like "strategic agility" underscore the need for adaptation. Joint Publication 1, which serves as the capstone publication for all U.S. joint doctrine, specifically praises strategic agility as a desirable quality for the military, defining it as "the ability to adapt, conceptually and physically, to changes in the international security environment." 30 At the highest strategic level, the current national military strategy (NMS) situates the military's responsibilities in meeting national security needs under the rubric of "shape, respond, and prepare now." 31 The military realizes that it must have the ability to respond across the spectrum of conflict, which would be a standard realist understanding. However, just as important is the stated need to contribute actively to peace, which runs counter to realist ideas.
Joint Vision 2020, which provides the template for the continuing transformation of the U.S.
armed forces, emphasizes that the military must be able to "both win wars and contribute to peace." 32 The notion of shaping falls under the general U.S. security posture of peacetime engagement in the post-Cold War period. Almost every senior military officers who has addressed National Defense University students in the academic year 2001 has stressed proactive "shaping" and "engaging" as integral functions that the military must perform, and this theme is prevalent in military-related writings. The NMS advocates shaping because it "helps foster the institutions and international relationships that constitute a peaceful strategic environment by promoting stability; preventing and reducing conflict and threats; and deterring aggression and coercion." 33 This underscores the point made above about deterrence and the importance of a multifaceted understanding of the environment and the actors within it, which a realist perspective does not promote.
One of the best illustrations of the military's role in proactively contributing to peace lies in theater engagement plans (TEPs). These aptly named plans, which the four regional combatant commanders are required to produce for their areas of responsibility, devote great attention to the concept of "shaping" the environment. What is particularly striking about this type of strategic approach is that this very active involvement of the military in engagement and cooperative activities in various regions of the world is contrary to standard realist understandings.
All of these instances demonstrate the truth that military security is a much broader concept than merely preparing to fight major or even limited wars. Thus, the professional military ethic demands that officers have a fuller understanding of security issues and the integrated use of all instruments of power (military, economic, political) in order to deal with the multifaceted threat environment. 34 A globalization perspective allows the military to act proactively on the nation's behalf to take advantage of opportunities to enhance national security rather than to merely respond to threats that have been allowed to mature, unhindered.
Note that these propositions run directly counter to Huntington's view of the professional ethic. He decries what he terms "fusionist theory" whereby the military are supposed to incorporate "political, economic, and social factors into their thinking;" and thereby "deny themselves in order to play a higher role [military statesman]." 35 Huntington even speaks disparagingly of the establishment of institutions like the National War College in the sense that not only would they "enable military officers to appreciate the complexities of national policy, but because they would also enable military officers to arrive at their own conclusions concerning political and economic issues." 36 His concern is that this would dilute the military officer's capability to effectively represent military security issues, their primary responsibility.
However, I believe that Huntington clearly has this wrong. While it is admittedly difficult, the complex international system demands that military officers possess a broad understanding in order to respond effectively to a spectrum of threats and opportunities. It is no longer possible, if it ever was, to separate out strands of putatively "military" issues versus "political" or "economic" issues. As General Chilcoat has convincingly argued, in order for military leaders to perform their role of advising on national security strategy, they must have a grasp of all the elements of national power. 37 If by engaging proactively the military is able to help forestall or resolve actual conflict or war, then surely that is a much better security situation for the United States. 
Conclusions

